Foreword: The Confident Court by McAward, Jennifer Mason
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
10-27-2014
Foreword: The Confident Court
Jennifer Mason McAward
University of Notre Dame Law School
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jennifer M. McAward, Foreword: The Confident Court, 47 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 379 (2014).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol47/iss2/2
FOREWORD: THE CONFIDENT COURT 9/25/2014 3:36 PM 
 
379 
FOREWORD: THE CONFIDENT COURT 
Jennifer Mason McAward 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Institutional actors at the federal and state level often claim that 
they deserve deference in the course of judicial review. Presidents, 
legislators, and academics alike have defended the interpretive 
competence of the coordinate branches of the federal government.1 
Federal agencies point to their expertise in arguing for deference.2 
And even certain state-run and private institutions have suggested 
that their decisions warrant respect from the judicial branch.3 
On a doctrinal level, the Supreme Court has agreed that there are 
indeed certain types of decisions and decision makers to which it will 
defer. Legislative fact-finding,4 agency rulemaking,5 and the 
educational assessments of state universities6 all deserve some 
measure of judicial deference. For every rule, though, there is an 
exception. The Court’s decisions in its October 2012 Term show that 
a majority of the Supreme Court is increasingly willing to supplant 
both the prudential and legal judgments of other institutional actors. 
Indeed, the Court this Term proved itself to be a confident 
institution, poised and willing to actively review policy judgments 
 
  Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School; J.D., New York 
University School of Law, 1998; B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1994. Thank you to my 
outstanding research assistant Colin Littlefield. 
 1. See, e.g., Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 
74 (1861) (attorney general opinion defending President Lincoln’s decision to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus and detain a suspected secessionist in disregard of a Supreme Court order); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive 
Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 85 (1993) (Each coordinate branch “has 
completely independent interpretive authority within the sphere of its powers.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(setting forth principles of deference to agency regulations). 
 3. See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013) (discussing 
deference to universities, churches, and civic organizations). 
 4. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
 5. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44. 
 6. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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made by Congress and executive agencies, as well as the operational 
details of programs adopted by state governments and institutions. 
Three years ago in these pages, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky noted 
that the Supreme Court’s rulings in the late 1980s “emphasized great 
deference to the decisions of the elected branches of government.”7 
He lamented the Roberts Court’s increasing willingness to substitute 
its own judgment for that of majoritarian institutions, and suggested 
that this is evidence of an ascendant, activist, conservative judicial 
ideology.8 Whether or not Dean Chemerinsky was correct in 
assessing the cause of the Court’s pivot,9 he certainly identified a 
clear trend in the Court’s decision-making methodology. Deference 
is on the wane. Assertions of judicial competence are on the rise. The 
October 2012 Term provides further evidence of this trend, as well as 
its extension beyond disregard for majoritarian institutions. This 
Term, the Court proved itself willing to disregard the views of non-
majoritarian institutions that traditionally have been thought to 
deserve a measure of judicial deference. 
Rather than attempt to identify the motivation for such a shift, I 
suggest simply that today’s Supreme Court is a confident one. A core 
group of Justices has an increasingly self-assured view of the 
judiciary’s ability to conduct an independent assessment of both the 
legal and factual aspects of the cases that come before the Court. 
Several cases from the October 2012 Term illustrate the Court’s shift 
away from deference. In each, the lower courts had embraced, and at 
least one party had defended, a posture of deference toward the 
challenged governmental program or decision. The Supreme Court 
ultimately disregarded those calls for deference and instead asserted 
and exercised its own independent judgment. In all, one is left with 
the impression of a high court that has fully embraced its “duty . . . to 
say what the law is.”10 
 
 7. Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court—October Term 2009 Foreword: Conservative 
Judicial Activism, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 863, 866 (2011) (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: 
The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 44, 48–49 (1989)). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. The Court’s confidence transcends ideology, at least in some cases. This Term, the 
Court was equally willing to closely examine and strike down federal laws extending as well as 
withdrawing civil rights protections. Compare Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) 
(striking down provisions of Voting Rights Act), with United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013) (striking down section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act). 
 10. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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II.  COMPETENCE TO REVIEW THE ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS OF STATE 
UNIVERSITIES: FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 
Fisher v. University of Texas11 provides this Term’s clearest 
assertion of the Court’s confidence in its own competence to evaluate 
the factual underpinnings of state programs. When the Court granted 
certiorari in Fisher, many foresaw a sweeping opinion on the 
constitutionality of affirmative action.12 What most commentators 
and interested parties overlooked,13 however, was the peculiar 
manner in which the Fifth Circuit panel had described its mode of 
review of the University of Texas’s race-conscious admissions 
program, even while labeling it as strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny, of 
course, traditionally places on the state actor the burden of proving 
that a racial classification is narrowly tailored to accomplish a 
compelling state interest.14 
In accordance with Grutter v. Bollinger,15 the Fifth Circuit 
stated that it would defer to a university’s academic judgment that 
diversity is a compelling interest.16 While such deference is 
traditionally not associated with strict scrutiny,17 the Grutter majority 
 
 11. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 12. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Faces Weighty Cases and a New Dynamic, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/us/supreme-court-faces-crucial-
cases-in-new-session.html. 
 13. Although the petition for certiorari focused heavily on this issue, Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari at 23–35, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), 2011 WL 
4352286, at *23–35, once the merits briefing began, the petitioner relegated this concern to page 
forty-seven of its fifty-seven-page brief, Brief for Petitioner at 47, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. 
Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1882759, at *47. Moreover, very few of the ninety-eight 
amicus briefs filed either at the certiorari or merits stages focused on the standard of review. See, 
e.g., Brief of the Asian American Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 
7–9, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), 2011 WL 5040038, at *7–9; 
Brief of the Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5–29, 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1961248, at *5–29. A few 
commentators did note the issue. See, e.g., Jennifer Mason McAward, Good Faith and Narrow 
Tailoring in Fisher v. University of Texas, 59 LOY. L. REV. 77, 81 (2013) (discussing the 
likelihood that the Court will use Fisher “to clarify that the university bears the entire burden of 
justifying a race-based classification”); Lyle Denniston, UPDATED: New Test of College 
Affirmative Action, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 15, 2011, 10:59 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com 
/?p=127255 (noting that the Fifth Circuit had concluded that “[j]udicial review of a college’s use 
of race . . . is less rigorous than for other official uses of race”). 
 14. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 232 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(2013). 
 17. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 379–80 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Ozan O. Varol, 
Strict in Theory, but Accommodating in Fact?, 75 MO. L. REV. 1243, 1253 (2010) (“[T]he 
Grutter Court was not faithful to the tenets of the traditional strict-scrutiny test.”). 
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stated that such deference was appropriate in educational affirmative-
action cases because, first, courts lack expertise to make such 
“complex educational judgments”18 and, second, the First 
Amendment protects the educational autonomy of universities.19 
Thus, Grutter recognized that strict scrutiny could accommodate a 
level of deference with respect to the question of whether a 
university’s asserted interest in diversity was compelling. 
The Fifth Circuit, however, extended that deference into the 
narrow-tailoring prong of the strict-scrutiny inquiry, stating that it 
would give a “degree of deference” to “the university’s good faith 
determination that certain race-conscious measures are necessary” to 
achieve diversity.20 Moreover, the court stated that it would assess 
the university’s good faith by “scrutiniz[ing] the University’s 
decisionmaking process” rather than the “merits of [its] decision” 
regarding how to structure its affirmative action policy.21 Finally, the 
court accorded the university a rebuttable presumption that it had 
indeed operated in good faith in creating its affirmative action 
program.22 
Thus, with respect to both prongs of the strict-scrutiny inquiry, 
the Fifth Circuit majority deferred to the university’s institutional 
judgments. Judge Garza wrote a special concurrence in which he 
agreed that the majority correctly applied Grutter, but lamented that 
Grutter itself “applied a level of scrutiny markedly less demanding” 
than strict scrutiny should be.23 Judge Garza questioned the “unusual 
deference” given to universities and attempted to identify a number 
of factors courts could employ in evaluating whether an affirmative-
action program is narrowly tailored.24 
Writing for a seven-member majority, Justice Kennedy 
concluded that the Fifth Circuit’s review deviated from Grutter and 
failed to impose “the demanding burden of strict scrutiny”25 on the 
University of Texas’s admissions program. While he accepted 
Grutter’s holding that educational diversity was a compelling state 
 
 18. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (majority opinion). 
 19. Id. at 329. 
 20. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 232–33. 
 21. Id. at 231 (emphasis added). 
 22. Id. at 231–32. 
 23. Id. at 247 (Garza, J., specially concurring). 
 24. Id. at 253. 
 25. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013). 
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interest,26 he also stated that intensive judicial review of any 
affirmative-action process was a “clear precondition” for such a 
program: “Race may not be considered unless the admissions process 
can withstand strict scrutiny.”27 
Strict scrutiny, as the Fisher Court described it, “is a searching 
examination, and it is the government that bears the burden to prove 
‘that the reasons for any [racial] classification [are] clearly identified 
and unquestionably legitimate.’”28 The Court condemned the Fifth 
Circuit’s willingness to defer to the university with respect to the 
narrow-tailoring prong of strict scrutiny and rejected the lower 
court’s application of a rebuttable presumption of good faith.29 
Rather, the Court repeatedly emphasized that deference with respect 
to narrow tailoring is inappropriate and that it “remains at all times 
the University’s obligation to demonstrate, and the Judiciary’s 
obligation to determine” that an affirmative action program is 
“specifically and narrowly framed” to attain diversity.30 The Court 
made clear that while it may “take account of a university’s 
experience and expertise,” it would be the Court’s ultimate 
responsibility to evaluate the university’s mode of individually 
assessing applicants, as well as to inquire carefully as to whether the 
university “could achieve sufficient diversity without using racial 
classifications.”31 On this latter point, the Court “must ultimately be 
satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce 
the educational benefits of diversity.”32 The university’s “good faith 
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives” is one data point 
the Court will consider, but it is incumbent upon the university to 
convince the Court not just that it followed a certain deliberative 
process, but that “available, workable race-neutral alternatives do not 
suffice.”33 
 
 26. Id. at 2418. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 2419 (alteration in original) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469, 505 (1989)). 
 29. The Court declined to consider whether Grutter’s deference to the university’s 
assessment of its compelling interest in diversity was appropriate because “the parties here d[id] 
not ask the Court to revisit that aspect of Grutter's holding.” See id. 
 30. Id. at 2420. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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Thus, the Court used Fisher not to opine on the constitutionality 
of affirmative-action programs but rather to issue a pointed reminder 
of the importance of the Court’s own role in assessing such 
programs. The Fisher Court claimed competence to assess the 
operational details of an affirmative-action admissions program, as 
well as the workability of race-neutral alternatives. And it explicitly 
rejected a university’s claim to greater institutional competence with 
respect to these aspects of its programs.34 Thus, Fisher provides a 
stark, if not unsurprising, example of the Court’s confidence in its 
ability to evaluate the factual assessments underlying race-conscious 
state programs. 
III.  COMPETENCE TO REVIEW THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF CONGRESS: 
SHELBY COUNTY V. HOLDER 
While the Fisher opinion focused on judicial process, the 
Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder is a sweeping decision 
on the merits that held unconstitutional section 4(b) of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965,35 which had set forth a formula for determining 
which jurisdictions would be required to seek federal preclearance 
for changes to voting rules.36 Although the Shelby County majority 
was opaque as to its standard of review, its willingness to disregard 
the 15,000-plus page legislative record developed during the 2006 
reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act bespeaks the Court’s 
confidence in its own ability to assess that formula on its merits and 
to displace Congress’s judgment as to its current viability.37 
Writing for a five-member majority, Chief Justice Roberts held 
that the coverage formula—which was repeatedly reenacted without 
changes, most recently in 2006—bore no “logical”38 or 
“sufficien[t]”39 relationship to “current conditions.”40 The Court 
condemned Congress for failing to adjust the formula to reflect the 
current record of electoral abuses and deciding instead to use a 
formula “based on decades-old data and eradicated practices.”41 The 
 
 34. Id. at 2420–21. 
 35. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2613 (2013). 
 36. Id. at 2630–31. 
 37. Id. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 38. Id. at 2629 (majority opinion). 
 39. Id. at 2627. 
 40. Id. at 2629. 
 41. Id. at 2627. 
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Court declined to defer to the 2006 legislative record cataloguing 
attempts at voting discrimination because that record “played no role 
in shaping the statutory formula” before the Court.42 
Strangely, the Shelby County majority’s analysis did not 
mention Congress’s power to “enforce” the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments,43 pursuant to which the Voting Rights Act and 
subsequent reauthorizations had been passed. Traditionally, laws 
passed pursuant to Congress’s power under the Reconstruction 
Amendments have received highly deferential review in the federal 
courts governed by McCulloch v. Maryland,44 which held that 
Congress deserves substantial deference in choosing the means by 
which to effectuate its enumerated powers.45 As the Court held in 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Fifteenth Amendment 
enforcement power permits Congress to “use any rational means to 
effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in 
voting.”46 Indeed, the district court and court of appeals in the Shelby 
County case invoked this standard and both determined that the 
extensive record of voting discrimination amassed by Congress in 
2006, as well as “Congress’s predictive judgment about the 
continued need for [preclearance] in covered jurisdictions,” 
warranted “substantial deference.”47 
The Shelby County Court instead invoked a different aspect of 
McCulloch, emphasizing that Congress’s chosen means of 
combatting voting discrimination were not “‘consist[ent] with the 
 
 42. Id. at 2629. 
 43. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. The Court briefly 
mentioned the Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power, Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2629, but 
did not suggest that it informed the Court’s standard of review. 
 44. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 45. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (13th Amendment); Katzenbach 
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (14th Amendment); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 
(1966) (15th Amendment), abrogated by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). Some 
scholars have suggested that McCulloch does not warrant such a high level of deference to 
Congress. See, e.g., J. Randy Beck, The Heart of Federalism: Pretext Review of Means-End 
Relationships, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 427 (2003); Jennifer Mason McAward, McCulloch 
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1769 (2012). 
 46. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 324. 
 47. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 498 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848 
(D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); see also Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 858 (“Given 
this, the district court concluded that Congress's predictive judgment about the continued need for 
section 5 in covered jurisdictions was due ‘substantial deference,’ and therefore ‘decline[d] to 
overturn Congress's carefully considered judgment.’” (citations omitted)). 
FOREWORD: THE CONFIDENT COURT 9/25/2014 3:36 PM 
386 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:379 
letter and spirit of the constitution.’”48 Specifically, the Court 
objected that requiring specified jurisdictions to seek preclearance 
imposed significant burdens on the constitutional principle of equal 
state sovereignty.49 Thus, while McCulloch traditionally has been 
invoked to support judicial deference to congressional legislation, the 
Court viewed that case as supporting judicial intervention and 
increased scrutiny when federal laws impinge on principles of 
constitutional structure. 
This change in emphasis and departure from deference is not 
entirely surprising. In the Fourteenth Amendment context, the 
Supreme Court has largely jettisoned the deferential reading of 
McCulloch, asserting instead the Court’s own competence to review 
both the factual record of constitutional violations developed by 
Congress and the “congruence and proportionality” between those 
violations and Congress’s chosen means of redressing them.50 The 
Shelby County majority, however, ignored the debate about whether 
to apply this same standard of review to Fifteenth Amendment 
legislation51 and simply asserted that the extensive legislative record 
bore no “logical” or “substantial” relation to the coverage formula at 
issue. The majority declined to respond to Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissenting opinion (and the lower court opinions), which detailed the 
ways in which Congress had in fact considered the adequacy and 
accuracy of the coverage formula in 2006, and argued that this 
legislative record deserved deference.52 
While it is difficult to discern a clear rule or standard emanating 
from Shelby County, the majority’s approach strongly suggests a 
high level of confidence in the Court’s own ability to assess a 
 
 48. Shelby Cnty, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421). 
 49. Id. at 427–28. 
 50. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997). 
 51. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009). The D.C. 
Circuit in Shelby County held that Congress’s 2006 record deserved deference even under the 
elevated City of Boerne standard. See Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 861, 873. 
 52. Retired Justice John Paul Stevens has critiqued the Shelby County majority for 
“fail[ing] . . . to explain” why a decision to discard an outdated preclearance formula “should be 
made by the members of the Supreme Court” rather than “[t]he members of Congress . . . [who] 
are far more likely to evaluate correctly the risk that the” politics of the former confederate states 
are still driven significantly by white supremacy. See John Paul Stevens, The Court & the Right to 
Vote: A Dissent, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Aug. 15, 2013), www.nybooks.com 
/articles/archives/2013/aug/15/the-court-right-to-vote-dissent/?pagination=false (reviewing GARY 
MAY, BENDING TOWARD JUSTICE: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2013)). 
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legislative record and to displace Congress’s predictive policy 
judgments. As Linda Greenhouse has noted, “distrust of Congress 
radiates from the majority’s every page.”53 Moreover, Shelby County 
may signal the Court’s increasing willingness to distance itself from 
the deferential posture that McCulloch v. Maryland has long been 
thought to endorse for the Court vis-à-vis Congress and to embrace a 
more active role in evaluating federal legislation passed pursuant to 
Congress’s powers under the Reconstruction Amendments. 
It bears noting that not all of the Court’s 2012 Term opinions 
involving Congress resulted in the Court supplanting congressional 
judgments with its own. Indeed, at first glance, United States v. 
Kebodeaux54 seems at odds with the thesis that the Court is 
increasingly willing to scrutinize congressional action. In 
Kebodeaux, the Court held that the federal Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act (SORNA) was an appropriate exercise of 
Congress’s power under the Military Regulation and Necessary and 
Proper Clauses.55 Justice Breyer’s opinion for the five-member 
majority quoted McCulloch and stated that Congress has “large 
discretion as to the means that may be employed in executing a given 
power.”56 It is a job for Congress, the majority said, to “weigh 
[conflicting] evidence and to reach a rational conclusion” regarding 
policy questions.57 Thus, the majority deferred to Congress’s 
assessment of the safety benefits of registration rules for sex 
offenders. 
The separate opinions in Kebodeaux tell a different story, 
however, and point to a group of Justices that is increasingly willing 
to rethink longstanding doctrine in order to expand the judiciary’s 
oversight of Congress. For example, Chief Justice Roberts concurred 
in the Kebodeaux judgment, agreeing that Congress was empowered 
to pass SORNA.58 However, he declined to join the majority’s 
opinion for fear that its discussion of the safety benefits of 
registration rules might imply incorrectly that Congress has “a 
 
 53. Linda Greenhouse, Current Conditions, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2013, http://opinionator 
.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/current-conditions/. 
 54. 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013). 
 55. Id. at 2505. 
 56. Id. at 2503 (quoting Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 355 (1903)). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 2505–06 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
FOREWORD: THE CONFIDENT COURT 9/25/2014 3:36 PM 
388 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:379 
federal police power.”59 He cited McCulloch, not for its suggestion 
of judicial deference, but for its assertion that Congress’s powers 
“‘are limited’ and that no ‘great substantive and independent power’ 
can be ‘implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a means of 
executing them.’”60 The sheer breadth of a federal police power, 
Chief Justice Roberts argued, would be inconsistent “with the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution,”61 and therefore such a power is not 
“proper” within the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause.62 
Chief Justice Roberts, therefore, used Kebodeaux as an 
opportunity to stake out a view that there are indeed limits to what 
Congress can do under the Necessary and Proper Clause. He 
implicitly tapped into scholarship asserting that the concept of 
propriety under the Necessary and Proper Clause provides an 
independent metric for assessing federal legislation and that laws that 
infringe on structural constitutional values are improper and thus 
invalid under the Clause.63 
Justice Thomas’s Kebodeaux dissent made this claim even more 
explicitly. As he had written in United States v. Comstock,64 Justice 
Thomas—joined by Justice Scalia in both cases65—argued that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause empowers federal legislation under two 
conditions. First, the law must be “directed toward a ‘legitimate’ 
end,” namely, the execution of a power expressly vested in Congress 
by Article I.66 “Second, there must be a necessary and proper fit 
between the ‘means’ (the federal law) and the ‘end’ (the enumerated 
power or powers) it is designed to serve.”67 While Justice Thomas 
has acknowledged that “McCulloch accords Congress a certain 
amount of discretion in assessing means-end fit under this second 
inquiry,”68 he clearly contemplates active judicial review on both 
 
 59. Id. at 2507. 
 60. Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421, 411). 
 61. Id. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421). 
 62. See id. 
 63. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). 
 64. 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1970 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 65. See Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2510 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia joined as to 
all parts except Part III.A.); Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1970 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia 
joined as to all parts except Part III.A.1.b.). 
 66. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2511 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 
1971 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 67. Id. (quoting Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1971 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 68. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1971 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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fronts. With respect to the second inquiry, the judiciary must ask 
whether Congress’s chosen means are “‘appropriate’ and ‘plainly 
adapted’ to the exercise of an enumerated power,” and “not 
otherwise ‘prohibited’ by” or “[in]consistent with” the 
Constitution.69 Thus, in cases where McCulloch was thought to 
mandate judicial deference, Justice Thomas has advocated for more 
intensive judicial review and proven himself willing to strike down 
federal laws. 
Thus, while Shelby County provides a concrete example of the 
Supreme Court’s willingness to displace congressional fact finding 
and policy judgments, it would be too easy to dismiss that opinion as 
an outlier motivated by the Justices’ political preferences. 
Kebodeaux demonstrates that the Court is still willing to defer to 
certain congressional judgments, but the separate opinions in that 
case—read in conjunction with Shelby County—point to an 
energized element of the Court that is explicitly prepared to assert 
the judiciary’s power and competence to review a broad range of 
federal legislation. 
IV.  COMPETENCE TO REVIEW EXECUTIVE AGENCY POLICY 
GUIDANCE: VANCE V. BALL STATE UNIVERSITY AND UNIVERSITY OF 
TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER V. NASSAR 
The Supreme Court long has accorded varying degrees of 
deference to the views of executive agencies charged with 
implementing federal law. In two cases this Term, the Court applied 
traditional doctrine to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulations,70 as well as an agency’s interpretation of a statutory 
ambiguity concerning the agency’s own jurisdiction.71 As in 
Kebodeaux, each case generated a separate opinion from Chief 
Justice Roberts arguing for greater judicial scrutiny of administrative 
interpretations.72 
 
 69. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2511 (quoting Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1972 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting)). 
 70. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1337–08 (2013) (applying 
deference under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)). 
 71. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874–75 (2013) (applying Chevron 
deference). 
 72. See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 
1338–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1339–44 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (arguing for greater judicial scrutiny of administrative interpretations). 
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In two other cases, however, a five-member majority of the 
Court declined to defer to two longstanding policy guidances issued 
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 
Chevron deference does not apply to the EEOC because Congress 
did not confer upon that body the authority to promulgate rules or 
regulations. However, the EEOC routinely issues policy guidances 
regarding Title VII and the other statutes it is charged with 
implementing. The Court has long held that such EEOC guidances 
and guidelines warrant deference to the extent the administrative 
judgment has the “power to persuade.”73 Specifically, the EEOC’s 
“policy statements, embodied in its compliance manual and internal 
directives . . . reflect a body of experience and informed judgment” 
that entitle them to “a measure of respect.”74 This level of deference 
to the agency—termed Skidmore deference for the case that first 
discussed it75—depends upon the degree of care in its formulation, 
its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and upon the 
persuasiveness of the agency’s position.76 Since the 1970s, the Court 
has split in its approach to EEOC cases, deferring to EEOC policy 
guidances in roughly half the cases before it.77 This past Term, 
however, the balance tipped away from deference to the EEOC. 
In Vance v. Ball State University,78 the Court considered the 
meaning of the term “supervisor” for purposes of assigning vicarious 
 
 73. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141–42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k), as recognized in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
 74. Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 75. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 76. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 
139–40). 
 77. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870–71 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (noting that the Court’s decision “accords with the longstanding views of the 
[EEOC]” as articulated in its compliance manual); Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 399 (2008) (deferring 
to EEOC compliance manual); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 
440, 449 (2003) (same); Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002) (same); Local 
No. 93, Int’l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 517–18 (1986) (same); 
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (same); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 
434 U.S. 136, 142 n.4 (1977) (same). But see Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 135, 150 (2008) 
(declining to follow EEOC compliance manual); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 
U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (declining to follow EEOC ruling); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 
U.S. 471, 480 (1999) (declining to follow EEOC guidance); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 
U.S. 244, 257–58 (1991) (same); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986) 
(same); Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 143 (same). 
 78. 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
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liability under Title VII. The EEOC had issued an Enforcement 
Guidance in 1999, adopting an open-ended approach to that term and 
tying supervisory status to the ability to exercise significant direction 
over another employee’s daily work.79 The Vance majority rejected 
the EEOC’s view and instead adopted a narrower definition focused 
on the supervisor’s ability to take tangible employment actions (i.e., 
significant changes in employment status) against the victim. The 
majority determined that the EEOC’s rule was “murky,”80 “open-
ended,”81 and susceptible of inconsistent application. The Court 
declined to defer to the EEOC for fear that its “standard[] would 
present daunting problems for the lower federal courts and for 
juries.”82 Dissenting, Justice Ginsburg took the majority to task for, 
among other things, failing to accord due deference to the EEOC’s 
guidance. What the majority took for ambiguity, Justice Ginsburg 
lauded as a “powerfully persuasive” view grounded in the realities of 
workplace structure.83 
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,84 
the Court considered the proper causation standard for Title VII 
retaliation claims. As in Vance, the EEOC had issued guidance and a 
compliance manual opining that such claims required evidence that 
retaliation was a motivating factor of the challenged action, as 
opposed to its but-for cause.85 The EEOC justified this position as 
consistent with both prior judicial decisions and the statutory purpose 
of allowing remedies for retaliation. The Nassar majority found that 
these explanations “lack[ed] . . . persuasive force” and therefore did 
not warrant deference.86 Justice Ginsburg again dissented, arguing 
that the EEOC’s “well-reasoned and longstanding guidance”87 
merited respect. 
 
 79. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS 
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS 3–4 (1999), available at 
Westlaw 1999 WL 33305874. 
 80. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2449. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 2450. 
 83. Id. at 2462. 
 84. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
 85. 2 U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8–II(E)(1) 
(Mar. 2003). 
 86. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533. 
 87. Id. at 2540 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
FOREWORD: THE CONFIDENT COURT 9/25/2014 3:36 PM 
392 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:379 
Vance and Nassar thus further substantiate the claim that 
today’s Court is a confident one. While it was possible to make a 
legal and pragmatic argument in favor of deference to the EEOC in 
both cases, the Court instead opted to exercise its own independent 
judgment in construing the requirements of Title VII. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The October 2012 Term was a particularly high profile one for 
the Supreme Court because so many of its cases involved politically 
charged topics, including affirmative action,88 voting rights,89 gay 
marriage,90 gene patenting,91 and the collection of DNA data from 
criminal arrestees.92 While it might be tempting to evaluate the Term 
by focusing on the outcomes of these cases, I suggest that there is a 
more important story lurking just under the surface. That story is one 
about judicial process. The Court proved itself increasingly willing to 
disregard the legal and policy judgments of Congress, state 
universities, and federal agencies—institutions to which the Court 
has, in the past, said it would defer at least under certain 
circumstances. While the Court will always formally embrace 
principles of deference grounded in separation of powers or 
institutional competence, its willingness to exercise its own judgment 
and disregard the considered views of other institutions was on full 
display this Term. Time will tell whether the Court’s confidence, as 
exhibited in cases like Fisher, Shelby County, Vance, and Nasser, is 
indeed part of a larger trend. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 88. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 89. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 90. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
2652 (2013). 
 91. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 92. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
